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The relationship between multifunctionality and the roles of rural communities has not been 
discussed fully although the connection between the two is an essential issue in the rural policy arena. 
Pursuing this issue, this paper considers that multifunctional hamlet activities are generated as 
institutional joint products within the hamlet. Also evaluated is the connection between 
multifunctional activities and institutional hamlet conditions under the Japanese direct payment 
program for less favored areas.  
Results of conceptual considerations and empirical evaluations reveal that specific multifunctional 
hamlet activities depend on hamlet conditions; those on the least favorable level tend to perform land 
preservation activities while those under the most favorable conditions tend to undertake recreational 
activity. Hamlets participating in forming landscape fall in the middle. Thus, firstly, institutional 
jointness is not constant but variable depending on hamlet conditions. Consequently, programs to 
enhance multifunctionality should respect hamlet conditions that represent different levels of 
institutional jointness of multifunctional activity rather than treat multifunctionality as a single 
concept. Secondly, for diversification, it would be effective to organize hamlet activities based on an 
open and wider human network rather than the traditional closed one in rural communities. 
JEL classifications: Q19, R0, Z13, Q18 
Keywords: multifunctionality, rural community, institution, jointness, diversification, human 
resources, direct payment  
 
1.  Introduction 
Little attention has been given to the multifunctionality provided by collective action, such as 
hamlet activities (for multifunctionality issues, see OECD, 2003 from the policy perspective, Van 
Huylenbroeck and Durand, 2003 from the European perspective and Ohe, 2001 from the Japanese 
perspective). Yet such multifunctional activities are crucial in promoting multifunctionality from the 
perspective of community-based agricultural and rural development. In studying this issue, an 
institutional approach is effective because hamlet activity has been based on the institutional process 
and such an approach will help to clarify the institutional jointness of multifunctionality (for  
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institutional jointness, see Hagedorn, 2003). 
As such an example of this jointness, a direct payment program for less favored areas was started 
in 2000 in Japan and has been used to promote multifunctionality in those areas (Yamashita, 2001 
explained the purpose and details). This program mandates that the rural community agree to 
maintain farmland and hamlet activities that promote multifunctionality in the rural community. This 
is because for centuries the role of the rural community has been essential in farming and in life as an 
institutional foundation in this country. We feel that this program is an example that implicitly 
assumes institutional jointness wherein hamlet activity generates multifunctionality.  
However, we do not have an effective institutional framework that can be applied to rural 
community issues because the institutional approach has focused on farm organizations and policy 
aspects rather than on the rural community (Van Huylenbroeck et al., 2004 took a neo-institutional 
economics approach to agricultural institutions). We need an institutional framework applicable not 
only to hamlet activities based solely on the traditional closed human network in the rural community 
but also to those based on an open human intercommunity network. The latter perspective will 
become more important in the rural policy arena for identification of new roles for rural communities. 
In consideration of this background, this paper focuses on multifunctional activities under the 
direct payment program and aims to clarify features of multifunctional hamlet activities from a 
conceptual and empirical point of view. In addressing these aims, we briefly outline the program. 
Then we explore a conceptual model to deal with institutional aspects of hamlet activity and we 
estimate empirical multifunctional activity determinant models to clarify the features of 
multifunctional activities. Finally, we discuss implications for future policy direction in promoting 
multifunctionality. 
 
2.  Data 
Data at the hamlet level are not disclosed on a nationwide basis. Therefore, this paper uses data 
disclosed by the administrative body of this program, the Rural Development Bureau, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan (MAFFJ), which is “The Result of the Direct Payment 
Program in the Hilly and Mountainous Areas 2001,” and which were aggregated at the prefectural  
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level in the 2001 fiscal year. We used the 2001 data that cover all 47 prefectures. 
 
3.  Outline of direct payment program and multifunctionality 
The program requires a hamlet agreement entered into by hamlets. This is because the program 
places importance on hamlet functions.  
This program has two aims: to preserve farmland and to promote multifunctionality in the hilly and 
mountainous less competitive areas based on hamlet activities that have been the foundation of 
farming and rural life for centuries. For this reason, hamlets that want to receive a direct payment are 
required to sign a hamlet agreement defining what activities they will perform for preservation of 
farmland and enhancement of multifunctionality as a unit of the local community. 
As of 2001, this program was implemented in the 1,900 towns and cities that had hamlet 
agreements. On average, each hamlet agreement had 19.5 participants, 20 ha of designated farmland, 
and payment received was 1,630,000 yen and 83,000 yen per capita as shown in Table 1. 
Among the hamlet agreement, preservation of land is the most common practice (58.6%), followed 
by formation of landscape (38.3%). Recreation or rural tourism accounts for only 3.2% of activity. 
These differences in share suggest that there are different cost levels necessary for each 
multifunctional hamlet activity. The lowest cost is related to preserving land and the highest cost is 
related to recreation, with forming landscape in the middle. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
different multifunctional activities are undertaken depending on the cost-bearing capability of the 
hamlets; the higher the cost for multifunctional activity, the fewer hamlets conduct that 
multifunctional activity.  
        We have characterized multifunctional hamlet activities into two types depending on the 
orientation of internalization of externality: the non-internalizing type and the internalizing type.  
The non-internalizing type is a hamlet activity that is based on traditional hamlet actions such as 
maintenance of the farm road and irrigation system and preserving farmland. These activities are 
conventionally institutionalized as collective work to maintain the farm production base in the 









Table 1. Outline of direct payment program (as of 2001) 










Total 613,304  627,736  51,132,000 - 
Average per hamlet 
agreement  19.5 20  1,630  83 
2) Farming consistency condition for hamlet agreement 





Maintenance of irrigation and farm road lines   73.8%  Low 
Exchange of farming operation and joint farming operation   23.7%  Middle 
Farming groups or farming corporate bodies  4.0%  High 
3) Types of multifunctional activity undertaken in the hamlet agreement 





Land preservation  58.6％  Low 
Landscape forming   38.3％  Middle 
Recreational   3.2％  High 
Source: The Result of Direct Payment Program in the Hilly and Mountainous Areas 2001, Rural Development 
Bureau, MAFFJ, 2002. 
Note: The sum of composition of farming consistency conditions does not equal to 100% because there were 
cases in which multiple conditions applied.  
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The internalizing type is a hamlet activity that is undertaken as a new activity such as rural tourism 
that has not been conventionally institutionalized although this activity could occur on the basis of 
conventional hamlet activity. Rural tourism is an activity that enables farmers to internalize the 
externality that has not been rewarded and then create a new income source. 
The landscape-forming function will be involving non-internalizing and internalizing activities 
because this function is considered to be comprised of two features. 
 
4.  Conceptual Model 
We have endeavored to clarify what and how hamlet conditions influence institutional cost structure 
and jointness. Figure 1 summarizes the view presented in this paper, wherein we assume that hamlet 
conditions determine multifunctional activities through the institutional cost structure in the hamlet. 
This whole process represents the institutional jointness that generates multifunctional hamlet 
activities. We present a conceptual model that enables us to explore the institutional factors and 
relationships between hamlet multifunctional activity and hamlet size for a hamlet agreement under 
this program (we incorporate the idea of the public choice theory, one of the fields of neo-institutional 
economics, into the conceptual framework. See Buchanan and Tullock, 1962 and Muller, 1980 for  
 
Figure 1.  Process of institutional jointness( hamlet function) of 
















Minimizing average cost behavior
Consensus-making behavior  




the public choice theory). First, we assume that farmers in the hamlet act on the principle of 
minimizing the average cost of the multifunctional hamlet activity rather than on the principle of 
minimizing marginal cost. This is because hamlet activities have been traditionally maintained by 
non-profit behavior as collective action for mutual help in the local community. Second, we assume 
that decision making about hamlet activity is determined by a consensus among hamlet members, 
which also has been the traditional decision-making method. This program allows farmers to take 
cost minimizing behavior in the range of a municipality that generally consists of multiple hamlets. 
Therefore, multifunctional activity would be undertaken not only on a single-hamlet basis, but also on 
a multiple-hamlet basis. 
With the above two assumptions, suppose other conditions are considered as constant and based 
on the reality of the hilly and mountainous areas, we assume two institutional factors that determine 
the cost of multifunctional hamlet activities; human resources and consensus-making among hamlet 
members. Thus, we consider two cost factors; the cost of utilizing human resources and the cost of 
consensus-making. The vertical sum of the two cost curves becomes the total average cost (AC). 
Therefore, equation (1) is assumed concerning multifunctional hamlet activity i. 
ACi (x) =HCi (x) +NCi (x)                                     (1) 
Where, ACi (x) =average cost curve of multifunctional hamlet activity i in the hamlet agreement 
HC i (x) =average cost for utilizing human resources for multifunctional hamlet activity i 
NC i (x) =average cost for consensus-making for multifunctional hamlet activity i 
x= size of hamlet agreement 
Farmers in the hamlet are supposed to minimize the average cost AC consisting of the two factors 
and then the optimal size of the hamlet agreement is determined for each activity. This is depicted in 
Figure 2 showing measurement of the cost level vertically and size of participants in the hamlet 



















First, the average cost of utilizing human resources has a negative relationship with the size of the 
hamlet agreement, which is illustrated by the curve HC. Utilizing human resources is crucial to 
conducting hamlet activity but is difficult, especially in hilly and mountainous areas.  In the case of 
little availability of human resources, the cost of utilizing human resources is prohibitive. Therefore, 
the more you expand the size of the hamlet agreement, the greater the possibility of finding 
appropriate human resources will be, and then these participants can share the cost of the 
multifunctional activity. In other words, per capita average cost of utilizing human resources is 
supposed to be negative or no correlation with the number of participants, meaning that we can 
expect a rightward-declining curve. 
Second, the average consensus-making cost has a positive relationship with size, which is 
illustrated as curve NC. The larger the number of participants, the greater is the increase in transaction 
cost for reaching consensus. This is because an increase in people involved shifts the pattern of 
consensus-making from that among acquaintances to that among those not acquainted. Consequently, 
the average cost for reducing a consensus is non-negatively correlated positive or no correlation with 
the size of hamlet agreements, meaning that we can expect a rightward-increasing curve.  
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Third, the vertical sum of the two cost curves results in the total average cost curve (AC). Thus the 
total average cost of multifunctional activity i for the optimal size hamlet agreement is determined 
and AC reaches the minimum at point e in Figure 2. The optimal size hamlet agreement would consist 
of a single hamlet or multiple hamlets, depending on the institutional cost factors. 
This is the basic conceptual framework of the relationship between multifunctionality and hamlet 
behaviour, which shows how the total average cost is determined. This study does not evaluate the 
effects of the direct payment, but evaluates the initial hamlet conditions for multifunctional activities. 
Thus the optimal size of each multifunctional activity is determined although the optimal point 
differs from one area to another depending on the cost structure attributed to local conditions of the 
institutional factors. Consequently, cost curves are obtained for each multifunctional activity and 
finally the VCi curve envelops the ACi  curves of each area at the national level concerning 
multifunctional activity i and VCj for j.  
 
5.  Analytical model 
Here we explore how to apply the above conceptual model to an empirical study. The information 
presented in Table 2 can show how the combination of shapes of the VC envelope cost curves 
influences the two institutional factors. There are four different cases of cost structure. 
The first case (Case 1) involves those hamlets that have a high level of hamlet function under 
favorable conditions. Thus, in Case 1 those hamlets can conduct multifunctional activity sufficiently 
at a low institutional cost in terms of utilizing both human resources and consensus-making. In this 
sense, those hamlets have higher cost-bearing capability for conducting multifunctional activity than 
ordinary hamlets and therefore the institutional jointness is supposedly more stable than in the other 
cases. For instance, in Figure 3 those hamlets that can conduct this multifunctional activity at the cost 
oa have cost-bearing capacity ad if od is the maximum cost level for implementing multifunctional 
activity. Nevertheless, this case hardly represents the majority of actual situations in hilly and   
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A BC ( = A + B )
Yes Case 1 Low Low
Diminishing and then
increasing
No Case 4 High High
Diminishing and then
increasing





Yes Case 2 Low High










Yes Case 3 High Low
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mountainous areas because this case is too favorable for ordinary hamlets in these areas. 
On the opposite extreme from Case 1, those rural areas with hamlet conditions at a low level 
inevitably have high costs both for consensus-making and utilizing human resources (Case 4). In this  
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case, the level of hamlet function is too low to start a hamlet agreement, meaning that the cost-bearing 
capability is too low, or institutional costs are still too high to bear for those hamlets. We do not expect 
institutional jointness in this case. This case is not illustrated because this case falls above od in Figure 
3. 
There exist intermediate cases in which hamlet function can be maintained at a level between those 
extreme cases. Those intermediate cases are not uncommon, and, in fact, in such hamlets one cost is 
usually higher than the other. For example, in Case 2 the cost of utilizing human resources is low 
while consensus-making costs are high. Thus, the shape of the VC  curve indicates that the 
cost-increasing portion is greater than the cost-decreasing portion, so the right upward portion 
becomes larger. Conversely, in Case 3, there is a high cost for utilizing human resources and a low 
consensus-making cost. Therefore, in Case 3, the cost-decreasing portion is greater than the 
cost-increasing portion, so the right downward portion becomes larger.  
 These different shapes provide not only information on institutional cost structure, but also on 
different prospects for multifunctional hamlet activities. In Case 2, it could be more effective to 
undertake hamlet activities within the traditional community range because it is rational for hamlets 
in Case 2 to save consensus-making cost. Conversely, in Case 3, it could be more appropriate to 
undertake hamlet activities in the inter-community range, which suggests that it will be rational to 
utilize the extended human network beyond a single hamlet boundary.  
What we deal with here are only Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3 because Case 4 is not considered to be 
feasible for a hamlet agreement.  
 
6.  Estimation model 
We focus on the three multifunctional activities: land-preserving activity, landscape-forming 
activity, and recreational activity. In fact, data for the cost function VC in the conceptual model above 
are not available, so that it is not possible to estimate the cost function directly. What is observable is 
the portion of undertaken multifunctional activity in the hamlet agreement at the prefectural level, 
called variable Y. Therefore, under the conceptual framework of cost minimizing behavior we use 
variable NY (=1-variable Y) as a proxy variable for the cost for each multifunctional activity. We  
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expect that the larger the variable NY is, the higher the cost for this multifunctional activity is. If the 
parameter is negative, the variable works favorably for the multifunctional activity and  if the 
parameter is positive, the variable works unfavorably. 
The next question is into which case each multifunctional activity actually falls. To clarify this 




















i                                          (2) 
Where, NY
k
i =1 - (portion of undertaken multifunctional activity k in prefecture i) 
x
k
i =participant size of multifunctional activity k in prefecture i 
HD
 k
i =regional dummy variable (Hokkaido=1, others=0) 
α
k
j=parameter to be estimated, α
k o=constant,  ε
k
i=stochastic error 
Regarding explanatory variables, first we use participant size per hamlet agreement as the 
explanatory variable of the size of the hamlet agreement. Furthermore, to consider the difference in 
farm size in Hokkaido, a northern island, from other parts of Japan, we use a regional dummy 
variable: Hokkaido=1, other prefectures=0.  The estimation model is a quadratic function. The 
estimation method is OLS.  
 
7.  Estimation results 
There is a strong correlation between the quadratic and linear terms of size variables (Table 3). 
Therefore the parameters are not stable and are hard to interpret in detail. This strong correlation 
between quadratic and linear terms means that the cost curve is a monotonously increasing or 
decreasing function for size. In other words, either the right downward portion or the right upward 
portion of the curve is quite large. This suggests that one of the two institutional factors works much 
more strongly than the other, which does not occur in Case 1 whereby the two factors work evenly. 
This is one of the main reasons for the serious multicollinearity. Thus we estimated models using only 
one size variable in quadratic or linear terms. Therefore, we only interpret the signs of the parameters. 
The results of these cases of single-size variables are also shown in Table 3. Adjusted R
2 is the highest 
for recreational activity, followed by land-preserving activity and is lowest for landscape-forming 







0.2056+ 0.8093*** 0.9490*** 0.3525*** 0.6827*** 0.9896** 0.1958*** 0.8415*** 1.0393***
(1.58) (6.19) (45.09) (13.14) (25.33) (221.08) (3.66) (15.58) (97.14)
0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** - - -
(0.08) (-0.27) (-4.72) (4.34) (-4.60) (-9.98) - - -
0.0103 -0.0089 0.0028* - - - 0.0110*** -0.0112*** -0.0037***
(1.16) (-0.99) (1.97) - - - (4.56) ( -4.60) (-7.69)
0.3428** 0.0646 -0.0312 0.3989** 0.0162 -0.0157 0.3394** 0.0759 0.0006
(2.15) (0.40) (-1.21) (2.62) (0.11) (-0.62) (2.23) (0.50) (0.02)
ajsR 
2 0.3748 0.2815 0.7066 0.37 0.2819 0.6874 0.3889 0.2967 0.5647
VIF 13.8748 1.0156 1.0435
CN 19.0863 1.9994 4.896
White test ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns
Table 3  Size of participants and multifunctional activities











Source: same as Table 1.
Note: The t ratios are given in parentheses. Significance levels are shown by the results of the t test, such that ***=1%,**=5%,
























































commonly undertaken across the nation, which makes the characteristic less apparent.  
What is obvious is that linear and quadratic terms have the same sign and the sign is different from 
one multifunctional activity to another. The sign of land-preserving activity is positive, while the 
signs of landscape-forming and recreational activity are negative. The interesting point here is that the 
sign reverses between the former and the latter two. What makes sense here is that in the first 
quadrant both variables have positive values. In that quadrant the land-preserving activity is 
monotonously increasing, which means that the right upward portion of the cost curve is large, while 
the landscape-forming activity and the recreational activity are monotonously decreasing, which 
means that the right downward portion is large. 
In summary, we can characterize the relation between the VC cost curve and multifunctional 
activities in Table 4. First, land-preserving multifunctional activity, as a non-internalizing activity, has 
the positive parameter of size. This result suggests that the right upward portion of the VC curve is 
large, corresponding to Case 2. Concerning cost factors, we can surmise that the decreasing effect of 
costs of utilizing human resources is smaller than the increasing effect of consensus-making cost. 
This is because this type of hamlet activity is not a new activity, so that the cost of utilizing human 
resources would be low. However, on the other hand, the cost of consensus-making would increase as 
size grows. In this case it is rational to take the behavior of saving the consensus-making cost. Thus, it 
is safe to say that this characterizes non-internalizing hamlet behavior well. Put differently, a 
relatively small size based on the conventional hamlet would be rational.  
On the other hand, landscape-forming activity and recreational activity, classified as internalizing 
or internalizing-related hamlet activities, have negative parameters of size. This case is considered to 
be that in which the right downward portion of the VC curve is large, corresponding to Case 3. This 
indicates that the decreasing effect of utilizing human resources is greater than the increasing effect of 
consensus-making cost. Therefore, it is rational to consider cost-saving behavior in utilizing human 
resources. This means that a group of several hamlets or a wider hamlet network will be effective for 
these types of activity. This is particularly true in rural tourism activity because often the main 
participants are middle-aged farming women who are proactive in extending the human network 
among themselves.  
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To summarize, the results of the model estimation suggest that there is an apparent difference 
derived from the cost structure between internalizing hamlet activity and non-internalizing activity. 
For non-internalizing hamlet activity, factors of consensus-making exert influence on the cost 
structure, so behavior in saving this cost is taken. Conversely, for the internalizing-related hamlet 
activity the cost of utilizing human resources is influential and this cost-saving behavior is performed. 
These results imply that we should take into account the different characteristics of institutional cost 
structure and therefore different jointness of multifunctional activity.  
 
8.  Conclusions 
The following are the main conclusions although we should be careful in generalizing the results to 
a great extent due to constraints on data and estimation results. 
Land-preserving activity is a commonly undertaken hamlet activity because the cost-bearing 
capability of performing this hamlet activity is rather low, which means that extra cost reduction 
efforts are not required for these hamlets. Thus this is an example of widely applied institutional 
jointness. 
Recreational activity needs a high level of hamlet function as needed for group farming. This 
means that there is potential to tackle a new activity based on this high level of hamlet function. In 
other words, the cost-bearing capability for this activity is so high that only those hamlets that can 
perform at such low cost can conduct this activity. Thus this type of institutional jointness is the most 
stable although it is not widely observed. 
Landscape-forming activity has intermediate features between land-preserving and recreational 
activities. So does the jointness. 
Consequently, first it was revealed that multifunctional activities differ in cost structure and 
subsequently institutional jointness varies. Therefore, multifunctionality should be promoted taking 
into account these differences of institutional jointness derived from local conditions. Second, a 
community-based approach especially based on an open and extended human network rather than on 
the traditional closed one in rural communities will be effective for developing rural and farm 
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